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Over the past three decades, scholars studying the phenomenon of political scandal have mostly 
based their works on the premise that scandals can only occur in liberal democracies. 
Contradictory to this assumption, however, some of the most heavily discussed phenomena in 
contemporary semi-authoritarian Russia are scandals emanating from the new, vibrant sphere of 
social media thriving on a largely unfiltered internet. How are these 'internet scandals' impacting 
politics in the semi-authoritarian political environment? To address this and related questions, I 
juxtapose two case studies of police corruption scandals that erupted in the social media sphere in 
2009/2010. Drawing on the findings, I argue that Russia's ruling elites are presently very much 
capable of managing these outbursts of public outrage. Mainly with the help of the powerful tool 
state-controlled television, public anger is very swiftly redirected towards lower level authorities 










Fundamentally, we believe that scandals can only occur in liberal democracies. 
(Markovits and Silverstein, 1988: 8) 
 
 
This quotation is taken from the introductory chapter to one of the most cited volumes on the 
politics of scandal, edited by Andrei Markovits and Mark Silverstein in 1988. Markovits and 
Silverstein (1988: 9) conceived of a political scandal as 'a betrayal of the public trust in terms of 
the accountability and process of the liberal democratic state'. According to their approach, in 
liberal democracies two inherently antithetic principles have to be balanced: (1) the need for 
power and (2) the simultaneous need to curtail power in order to guarantee the individual's 
autonomy from the state. In this perspective, the quest for political power at the expense of due 
process emerges as the driving force behind the phenomenon of political scandal. A strong faith 
of the members of a society in the liberal process arises as a necessary precondition (Markovits 
and Silverstein, 1988: 7-9).  
Since Markovits and Silverstein published their volume in 1988, most authors (with rare 
exceptions being, for instance, Klier et al., 1989, or Sabrow, 2004) have followed them in their 
basic assumption quoted above. 'Power and control bodies must not coincide' concurs Neckel 
(2005: 103) nearly twenty years later. 'That is why there are no political scandals in dictatorships, 
with the possible exception of those that the ruling powers publicly stage themselves because of 
internal power struggles' (Neckel, 2005: 103). In the same vein, Esser and Hartung (2004: 1048) 
understand scandals 'in the sense of being possible only in open and democratic societies with a 
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free press', arguing that scandals under Eastern Germany's communist regime 'simply could not 
exist'. Hondrich (2002: 48) points to the fact that the crimes of Stalin did not erupt into scandals 
at their time, but were unveiled only by his successor Khrushchev years later. 
In 2004, the American Behavioral Scientist added a series of high-profile articles to the academic 
discourse by publishing two special issues dedicated to the topic. However, the two editors again 
restricted the scope of their global, comparative approach to 'Political Scandal and Media Across 
Democracies' (Tumber & Waisboard 2004a; 2004b). This article aims at going beyond this 
traditional strand of literature, challenging it in at least two points: (1) Over the past two decades, 
most scholars have based their studies on Markovits and Silverstein's basic assumption that 
scandals can only occur in liberal democracies. Thus, this study wants to raise the question: What 
specific patterns of scandal communication can be observed in the semi-authoritarian political 
environment of contemporary Russia? (2) Most studies on scandals were authored before the rise 
of the internet and social media. Therefore, this article seeks to take under scrutiny scandals that 
have emanated from the new sphere of social media. How are such 'internet scandals' impacting 
politics in contemporary Russia? 
To embark on this new path of research seems even more timely, as a large number of semi-
authoritarian, so-called 'hybrid' regimes (cf. Boogards, 2009) have only recently emerged in the 
'third wave of democratization' (Huntington 1991) since the mid 1970s and especially after the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc in the early 1990s. Since then, a large 'grey area' of political regimes 
has evolved that can neither be regarded as classic authoritarian nor as fully-fledged democratic. 
Trying to capture the nature of these new forms of rule, scholars have developed a whole series 
of concepts of so-called 'democracies with adjectives' (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). Russia is 
typically considered one of these new 'semi-authoritarian', 'semi-democratic', 'defective', 
'sovereign', or 'guided' democracies. While at least semi-competitive elections are held on a 
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regular basis, civil rights and political liberties such as the freedom of association or the freedom 
of the press continue to be severely restricted (Freedom House 2010). Last but not least, this 
article aims to enrich the broader, currently ongoing academic debate on the question if the 
internet is to be seen rather as a new 'technology of liberation' or as one of 'control' (Dreibert & 
Rohozinski 2010: 44; Diamond 2010). Are scandals emanating from the new sphere of social 
media 'empowering' Russian citizens? 
To address these and related questions, the article resorts to the case study method, and more 
specifically to the approach of 'process tracing' as proposed by George and Bennett (2005).  
According to George and Bennett (2005: 73-88), the study will proceed in the following four 
steps: (1) The next section develops a research design. It sketches out the research objectives, 
carefully selects two cases of internet scandals and then outlines theoretical concepts to be 
observed. (2) Subsequently, the two case studies are accomplished. (3) A subsequent section 
discusses the two cases in comparison, and (4) a last paragraph draws conclusions and points out 
promising avenues for future research.  
 
Research Design and Socio-political Background   
 
In this section, the research design of the study is developed in five steps (George and Bennett 
2005, 73-79). First, the research objectives are elaborated. Second, the variables to be observed 
are selected. Then, two case studies are deliberately chosen for investigation. Fourth, the variance 
of the variables is described and, fifth, questions to be asked of each case are formulated. 
 
 6 
Elaborating Research Objectives 
This study hopes to generate significant contributions, primarily of idiographic and heuristic 
value (George and Bennett, 2005: 75), to the academic literature on political scandal arising from 
the new sphere of social media. While the findings are expected to be valid primarily in the 
socio-political context of contemporary Russia, a certain hypothetical and explanatory value with 
regard to the complex interrelation between new media, power and scandal in other semi-
democratic and authoritarian societies is aspired.  
 
Selecting Variables to Observe 
There are a multitude of sophisticated conceptualizations of the phenomenon of political scandal. 
Most of these definitions stem from the disciplines of sociology, communication and political 
science and have been tailored to analyse scandals in Western, democratic societies (Tumber and 
Waisbord, 2004a: 1032; Hondrich, 2002: 40; Thompson, 2000: 13; Neckel, 1989: 56). To study 
scandals in the hybrid polity of contemporary Russia, a rather lean definition proposed by Esser 
and Hartung (2004) seemed most suitable. Esser and Hartung (2004: 1041) conceive of a scandal 
'as the intense public communication about a real or imagined defect that is by consensus 
condemned, and that meets universal indignation or outrage'. 
In order to identify meaningful and relevant variables for observation, the context of both, the 
Russian semi-pluralistic media environment and the Russian semi-democratic political system 
have to be considered. As to the Russian media system, this study distinguishes four spheres of 
media (see Figure 1) that differ mostly according to their position vis-à-vis the ruling elites: (1) 
official mass media, (2) mainstream mass media, (3) liberal-oppositional mass media, and (4) 
social media.  
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Figure 1. near here 
 
The most powerful outlets in the first sphere of official media are the three most-watched national 
TV channels: Perviy Kanal, Rossiya 1 and NTV. These channels are controlled by the ruling 
elites, either explicitly via state-ownership or implicitly via ownership of state enterprises (see 
Mickiewicz 2006, 6-7; Oates 2007, 1284-1288). To secure control, 'trusted' persons from the state 
apparatus are appointed to key positions of these media organizations at regular intervals 
(Simons, 2010: 25-26). In addition, weekly meetings between Kremlin officials and top television 
directors are reported. In these meetings, Kremlin officials allegedly go as far as to hand out 
talking points and recommend approaches for news coverage of the upcoming topics of the week 
(Baker and Glasser, 2005: 162). As a result, these official media outlets must be regarded as 
finely-tuned propaganda tools that herald the political line of Russia's ruling elites around the two 
central figures Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitriy Medvedev. Voices opposing 
this 'tandem of power' are hardly ever quoted. 
The second category is the sphere of mainstream mass media, flagshipped by a range of widely 
circulated newspapers such as Moskovskiy Komsomolets with roughly 1.2 million readers or 
Komsomol'skaya Pravda with approximately three million readers (Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
2011; Komsomol'skaya Pravda 2010). These media outlets are either owned by wealthy 
individuals or by large corporations, whose profits are heavily dependent on the benevolence of 
the power centre. Therefore, the political reporting of these media is, in broadest terms, 
supportive of the semi-authoritarian regime, even though selected measures of the 'tandem of 
power' may be occasionally criticised.  
The third sphere of liberal-oppositional media sharply opposes the regime and advocates 
Western, liberal-democratic values. The audience of these media outlets is relatively small. The 
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probably most renowned publication, the newspaper Novaya Gazeta, comes out only three times 
a week with slightly over 110.000 printed issues (NTS, 2010). 
'Social media' are understood in the following as 'a group of Internet-based applications […] that 
allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content' (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 61). A 
characteristic feature of this sphere is its network structure. In this article, primarily the content of 
blogs, microblogs, social networks and forums will be analyzed under this category. Roughly 70 
percent of the Russian internet users had established a profile on a social networking site in 2008 
(see Alexanyan, 2009: 1-4). As of April 2010, approximately 34 percent of all Russians were 
accessing the internet at least once a week (VCIOM 2010).   
At the time of research in summer 2010, not only freedom of the press was constricted in Russia's 
'defective' democracy but also the right to free assembly was curtailed. Protests organized by a 
coalition of opposition groups under the slogan 'Strategiya 31' on the 31st day of each month 
were repeatedly dispersed by the police, with opposition leaders and participants being 
temporarily detained. None the less, according to polls carried out by various institutions, 
approvals rates of the two leading figures President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin 
continued to range high, between 59 and 73 percent (Economist 2010).  
As to the key policies pursued by the 'tandem of power', Medvedev was heavily popularizing and 
propagating a political strategy of 'modernization' (Kamyshev, 2010). In accomplishing this goal, 
he obviously considered the new medium internet and e-government tools of signal importance. 
Other repeatedly announced political goals were the 'fight against corruption' and the 'reform of 
the police' (Ryzhkov, 2010). While Russia's police forces have traditionally been perceived as 
extremely corrupt, the situation seemed to become unbearable in 2009 after police officers had 
murdered several civilians (O'Flynn, 2009).  
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In this socio-political context, when comparing communication patterns of scandals, at least the 
following four variables seemed of outstanding interest to observe: (a) the travelling of news 
memes and specific interaction patterns between the three traditional spheres of media and the 
new, networked sphere of social media; (b) the strategies of the ruling elites in dealing with 
scandals arising from the new sphere of social media; (c) the possible consequences of these 
scandals for the social practices of 'corruption' and the 'rule of law'; (d) an evaluation of the 
success of 'scandal management' by the ruling elites.   
 
Selecting Cases 
In the process of case selection, only scandals were taken into consideration that (a) emanated 
from the new sphere of social media and that (b) were widely covered in the mass media. After 
screening roughly a dozen possible instances that occurred during the two-year period 2009/2010, 
I decided to juxtapose two largely similar cases that yet greatly differ in one key variable: in their 
potential to endanger the legitimacy of the ruling elites. In the first case study (the 'Living Shield' 
scandal), the scandal posed only a minor threat to the ruling elites, mainly because the whistle-
blower co-operated with the authorities. In the second case study (involving the so-called 'honest 
police Major Dymovskiy'), the whistleblower refused to co-operate. In result, the scandal was 
perceived as a major threat by the ruling elites. Aside from this fundamental difference, the two 
cases were similar in their key features: Both scandals erupted after individuals had uploaded 
videos to YouTube in approximately the same time period between late 2009 and early 2010, 
both received considerable public attention, and both touched upon the very sensitive topic of 




Developing Questions to Be Asked of Each Case 
To observe the theoretical concepts indicated above, the following questions shall be answered in 
each of the two case studies:   
 
a) Travelling of News Memes and Patterns of Communication.  How did the scandal erupt in 
the sphere of social media and what role did various types of social media (blogs, 
microblogs, forum entries) play in this process? At what point did the scandal spill over to 
the spheres of official, mainstream and liberal-oppositional mass media and what impact 
did traditional mass media have on the eruption of the scandal?  
b) Strategies of the Ruling Elites. How was the scandal covered and framed in the sphere of 
official media (i.e. in the tightly state-controlled TV channels)? What real-life measures 
were undertaken by the authorities (ousting of officials, lawsuits, pressure on media 
outlets, etc.)? 
c) Potential Impact on the Rule of Law and Corruption. Were the scandalized persons 
punished for their perceived transgressions, and were they punished according to the law? 
Did media coverage of the scandal, most probably, deter future transgressors from similar 
misconduct and corruption?  
d) Success of the Strategies of 'Scandal Management' of the Ruling Elites. Overall, did media 
coverage of the scandal rather undermine or promote the legitimacy of the ruling elites 
and the political regime as a whole?  
 
According to these four groups of questions, the first case study, the so-called 'Living Shield' 
scandal, will be taken under scrutiny in the next section. In this case study, the whistle-blower 
agreed to co-operate with the ruling elites.  
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Case Study I: The 'Living Shield' Scandal 
 
On 7 March 2010, 29-year-old Stanislav Sutyagin uploaded a self-recorded video to YouTube 
(Sutyagin81, 2010a). The three-minute clip shows the young man talking to his webcam, giving a 
detailed account of how he was stopped by the Moscow traffic police on a city highway two days 
before at 5.30 am. Together with several other drivers, Sutyagin was ordered to park his old 
Mercedes crosswise to the road. A couple of minutes later, suddenly, a car appeared and rushed 
through the roadblock at high speed, damaging Sutyagin's Mercedes, and endangering him and 
the other drivers who had all remained in their vehicles. It was only then that Sutyagin realized 
that he had been taking part in a 'human roadblock', a 'Living Shield' (Russian: Zhivoy Shchit) set 
up by the policemen in a hunt for escaping criminals. In his YouTube video titled Zhivoy Shchit, 
Sutyagin (Sutyagin81, 2010a) complains:  
 
'Aren't our lives worth anything in our Russian state? […] I think this is utter lawlessness. 
The most interesting thing is that they [the policemen] told us openly: Look, guys, you 
won't get anything [for your damaged vehicles]; we haven't caught the criminals!' 
 
Travelling of News Memes and Patterns of Communication 
How did Sutyagin's video statement erupt into a scandal on the Russian internet? Figure 2 shows 
the mentions of the term Zhivoy Shchit in the days after the video was uploaded. The numbers 
were compiled with the help of the blog search tool Puls blogosferi (2011) provided by the 
leading Russian search engine Yandex. The tool allows tracing separately the number of (a) blog 
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entries, (b) microblog (mostly Twitter) entries, (c) comments, and (d) forum entries. As the term 
Zhivoy Shchit is only very rarely used in common Russian language, we can assume that close to 
all of the counted items are related to Sutyagin's YouTube message.  
 
Figure 2. near here 
 
The four graphs in Figure 2 trace the number of daily mentions of the term Zhivoy Shchit in the 
sphere of social media. As can be seen, the intensity of communication reached its peak on 10 
March, three days after Sutyagin had uploaded his scandalous video message. On that day, at 
least 450 blog entries were authored on the topic. In the three days that followed the peak, the 
intensity of communication decreased steadily. In the days after 14 March, it evened out to a 
rather low level. From these findings, we can draw three preliminary conclusions: (1) The Living 
Shield scandal was discussed with similar intensity in blogs, microblogs and forums. (2) The 
intensity of communication reached its peak four days after the video was published. (3) The 
scandal irritated the sphere of Russian social media for a relatively short period. After one week, 
the discussions rapidly ebbed of.  
How did the three spheres of official, mainstream and liberal-oppositional media contribute to the 
emergence of this pattern of communication? The first mass medium to pick up the event was the 
oppositional online newspaper Gazeta.ru (2010a). It published an article about Sutyagin's 
message two days after the video had been uploaded, on 9 March at 12.29 pm. Later on the same 
day, other oppositional media outlets followed, amongst them the radio station Ekho Moskvy 
(2010). The sphere of official mass media also reacted astonishingly quickly. Only a few hours 
after Gazeta.ru had published the first article, Vesti Moskva (a local appendix to the main news 
program on Rossiya 1) reported the incident shortly after 5 pm (Vesti Moskva, 2010a). Within 
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hours, other state-controlled and mainstream media outlets followed suit. In the next days, the 
scandal was prominently covered in all four media spheres.   
As these findings reveal, the Living Shield scandal reached its peak in the sphere of social media 
only after it already had been extensively covered in the spheres of oppositional, mainstream, and 
even official mass media (see Figure2). On 8 March, the day before the mass media picked up the 
scandal, only 9 blog entries had discussed the term Zhivoy Shchit. The overwhelming majority of 
the more than 450 blog entries posted on the next day appeared after the scandal was reported by 
oppositional, mainstream and even state-controlled mass media.  
  
Strategies of Scandal Management pursued by the Ruling Elites  
How did the major state-controlled television channels frame the Living Shield incident? As 
pointed out above, the first broadcast by Vesti Moskva (2010a) appeared astonishingly quickly, 
only five hours after the scandal was first brought to the attention of a wider audience by the 
online newspaper Gazeta.ru (2010a). Not only the speed but also the technical and human 
resources employed by the state-controlled television channel were impressive: Already this very 
first broadcast features a 3D animation of the accident, alongside with an interview with the 
blogger Sutyagin. It announces that the scandal is being investigated.  
On the same evening at 9 pm, the most popular Russian newscast Vremya (2010a) dedicates a 
four-minute item to the incident. Various speakers of the traffic police apologize. In the afternoon 
of the next day, 10 March, the news program Vesti Moskva (2010b) reports that the Duma, the 
Russian parliament, will supervise the investigation, and that another government body, the 
Public Chamber, has offered to provide legal support to the affected drivers. Another Vesti-
newscast promulgates that the two criminals who rushed through the roadblock have finally been 
caught (Vesti 2010a). Two – not more than supposedly guilty – Georgian men are shown and 
 14 
rudely questioned in front of the running TV cameras. The story line is continued on the next day, 
11 March, with a newscast in which the chief of the Moscow traffic police, Sergey Kazantsev, 
bestows a certificate of bravery to the blogger Sutyagin (Vremya 2010b). In addition, Sutyagin is 
presented with a clock. On the same day, the radio channel Vesti FM (2010) heralds: 'The reform 
of the Ministry for Internal Affairs has been prepared by bloggers'.   
 
Potential Impact on the Rule of Law and Corruption 
 
Were the culprits of the Living Shield scandal punished? According to media reports (Gazeta.ru 
2010b), the chief of the Moscow traffic police Kazantsev received a 'strong reprimand'; the police 
officer who led the operation was dismissed; and one of the ordinary police officers who 
participated in the operation was sentenced to one year in prison. Thus, it can be argued that the 
outcome of the Living Shield scandal most probably had a deterring effect. Particularly low- and 
mid-level police officials might be afraid of comparable misconduct in the future. In this respect, 
it could even be inferred that the new sphere of social media is contributing to a certain 'control'- 
or even 'muckraking'-function of the Russian press, as it is typically cherished in Western 
democracies.  
But, was the rule of law actually enforced? As a closer look reveals, the scandal was not resolved 
according to provisions of law and with the help of independent courts, but rather pursuant to the 
strategies of various political actors and institutions in their struggle for power. First, the affected 
drivers were not paid fixed sums of indemnities established by a court verdict but their cars were 
repaired in the workshop of the Moscow traffic police on the personal order of police chief 
Kazantsev. Then, the parliament exceeded its constitutional competencies by publicly declaring 
that it would supervise the investigation. Third, the harsh prison sentence for the low ranking 
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police officer was criticised by many observers as the 'sacrifice of a pawn' (Abstract2001, 1999; 
Gazeta.ru 2010b) staged by the ruling elites. On the day of the court verdict, the state-controlled 
TV channels could herald in the main evening news: 'Police inspector sentenced for endangering 
the lives of drivers' (Vremya 2010b). Thus, a rather arbitrary jail sentence for an ordinary police 
officer was conveyed to the public as a major victory of the ruling elites in the fight against 
corruption. To summarise, the Living Shield scandal may well have helped to curtail corruption 
and misconduct of lower- and mid-level officials. Yet, it did not contribute to the strengthening of 
a culture of the 'rule of law' in contemporary Russia. 
 
Success of the Strategies of 'Scandal Management' Pursued by the Ruling Elites 
 
In broadest terms, the message that remained with the majority of Russian media recipients can 
be summarized as follows: 'Misconduct and arbitrariness of our police force were, at least in the 
case of the Living Shield scandal, tackled efficiently by our political leaders with the help of 
critical citizens and the new technology internet. State bodies – the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
the parliament, and the public chamber – were co-operating efficiently to thwart this timely 
nuisance'. Hence, the Living Shield scandal did not weaken but rather strengthen the legitimacy 
of the ruling elites and the semi-democratic regime as a whole. With the whistle-blower Sutyagin 
willingly co-operating, the outburst of public outrage erupting from the sphere of social media 
could be quickly tamed and deflected towards low ranking police officers and foreign, 
supposedly hostile powers (two Georgian criminals). However, these strategies of scandal 
management are much more difficult to pursue, if the whistle-blower refuses to co-operate – as 
was the case in the scandal under scrutiny in the following section.   
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Case Study II:  The Honest Police Officer Dymovskiy 
 
On 5 November 2009, the 'honest police Major Aleksey Dymovskiy', as he would later be dubbed 
by various media outlets, uploaded two videos of approximately six minutes length to YouTube 
(Meechael, 2009a; 2009b). The two clips showed the mid-level police officer in his uniform 
against a blue background, speaking out calmly but frankly about corruption and misconduct in 
the police forces of his home town Novorossiysk in Southern Russia:  
 
'I am talking to those officers for whom words like 'honour' or 'dignity' are not just words 
or sounds. […] I have worked for the police for ten years. Ten years I gave away for my 
motherland. […] I tried to create something fair, something just. […] I have lost two wives 
who refused to stay with me because my working schedules were not very, how can I say, 
'steady'. […] Our bosses treat us like cattle. […] I am talking also to you Vladimir 
Vladimirovich [Putin] […] Please understand me. I love my work, I love my work. But I 
can't stand fulfilling plans by detecting crimes that do not exist and by arresting people that 
are not guilty. […] I will resign.' (Meechael, 2009a) 
 
Travelling of News Memes and Patterns of Communication 
 
How did Dymovskiy's video message erupt into a scandal in the sphere of social media? To trace 
the intensity of scandal communication, the Puls blogosferi tool was employed to search for 
items containing the word 'Dymovskiy'. As no other person with the same name was popular in 
November 2009, we can assume that close to all items that quoted the name were discussing the 
YouTube messages of the 'honest police Major Dymovskiy'. As Figure 3 shows, a pattern of 
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communication comparable to that in the first case study emerged. The peak intensity of 
communication was reached on 10 November, five days after Dymovskiy had uploaded his clips 
to YouTube. Communication levelled off after 13 November, though discussions still flared up 
occasionally in the weeks thereafter. As Figure 3 illustrates, the scandal irritated the sphere of 
Russian social media for a much longer time period than the Living Shield incident. Interestingly, 
microblog entries played a minor role in this case study. This is probably due to the fact that the 
Dymovskiy scandal occurred five months before the Living-Shield-Incident, when Twitter was 
still far less popular with Russian internet users.   
 
Figure 3 near here 
 
How did the four spheres of media interact in the emergence of this scandal? Dymovskiy 
published his videos on a Thursday evening. In the sphere of social media, the first major 
discussions broke on Friday night, primarily in forums such as, for instance, a discussion group 
of war veterans (cf. Boevoe Bratstvo, 2009). Again, liberal-oppositional mass media were the 
first to pick up the scandalous news. Gazeta.ru (2009a) published a first article on the very same 
Friday evening at 9.03 pm. At 11.15 pm, the radio station Ekho Moskvy (2009) followed suit. 
Major mainstream media picked up the story on Saturday. The sphere of official media, however, 
reacted very reluctant in this case study. The main newscasts Vremya and Vesti on the two 
leading state-controlled TV channels completely ignored the incident. The third channel NTV 
reported the story on Saturday, 7 November, in the 8 pm evening news (NTV, 2009). It followed 
up on Sunday and Monday, but then stopped coverage. 
These findings suggest at least four conclusions: (1) Just as in the Living Shield case, 
oppositional and mainstream mass media played a crucial role in catalyzing the outbreak of 
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public outrage in the sphere of social media. (2) However, on the three leading state-controlled 
TV channels information about the incident was deliberately suppressed. (3) Nonetheless, the 
intensity of scandal communication in the sphere of social media was definitely not lower than in 
the Living Shield scandal. (4) Consequently, the information blockade of the state-controlled TV 
channels could not prevent the eruption of the scandal in the spheres of social, oppositional and 
mainstream media.  
 
Strategies of 'Scandal Management' Pursued by the Ruling Elites 
 
After posting his videos on Thursday, 5 November, and gaining rapidly in popularity over the 
weekend, the 'honest police Major Dymovskiy' held news conferences in Krasnodar on 9 
November and in Moscow on 10 November. Even though these news conferences attracted 
flocks of journalists, none of the three major TV stations covered the events (BBC, 2009: 6). In 
the mainstream print media, several acts of blatant censorship occurred. For instance, the 
country's most popular tabloid title Komsomol'skaya Pravda, despite having hosted Dymovskiy's 
news conference in Krasnodar, later removed nearly all information about the scandal from its 
website (BBC, 2009: 6). 
Why did the state-controlled TV-channels react, unlike in the first case study, with an 
information blockade? Obviously, in this case, the responsible decision-makers had realized 
rather quickly that the 'honest police Major Dymovskiy' was a difficult character to handle. 
According to a forum entry of a fellow policeman (Alexpolice, 2009), Dymovskiy was 
interviewed by journalists of the state channel Rossiya 1 only a few hours after his video 
messages started to gain popularity. However, this footage was never broadcasted. In the weeks 
to come, according to media reports (Gazeta.ru, 2009b), Dymovskiy did not only refuse a 
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proposed meeting with generals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs but also, on 20 November, 
even a meeting with Putin himself. Very bluntly, Dymovskiy claimed that a meeting with Putin 
would be an 'offence to his honour'.  
The issue became even more delicate for the ruling elites, as law enforcement officials from all 
over the country started to follow Dymovskiy's example, uploading approximately half a dozen 
of similar self-recorded messages to the net (BBC, 2009: 2-3). This wave of public 
denouncements was soon branded by the media as the 'Dymovskiy effect'. Infatuated by the 
sudden spate of support, Dymovskiy declared that he intended to found his own party on 23 
November. On November 28, protests were organized in Dymovskiy's name with the help of a 
Facebook group, but only 100 people took to the street in St. Petersburg.  
On 22 January 2010, Dymovskiy was arrested after having been sentenced by a court for fraud. 
Reputedly, the 'honest police major' had stolen a battery out of the car of a criminal several years 
ago. On 18 February, it was announced that Dymovskiy would be subjected to psychoanalytical 
analysis, obviously in a Soviet tradition of dealing with dissidents. A few days later, Dymovskiy's 
lawyer was found beaten up in the street with his legs, arms and fingers broken. The allegedly 
guilty person was later acquitted. According to the official version, the suspect had only wanted 
to help the lawyer when he saw him being beaten up by strangers. On 7 March, Dymovskiy was 
preliminarily released. Yet a law suit with a maximum of ten years prison was announced to be 
pending  
On 23 March, Dymovskiy was found guilty of libelling two of his Novorossiysk colleagues in his 
video-messages by a local court. He was sentenced to pay 50,000 roubles (approximately 
US$1600) to each of them and to apologize publicly. On 27 March, a court refused Dymovskiy's 
plea to be reinstalled as a police officer in Novorossiysk. In early April, Dymovskiy published 
two more video messages, this time addressed to President Medvedev. Yet Dymovskiy's second 
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series of video clips (Dumovskiy, 2010) attracted considerably less attention in all media spheres, 
including that of social media. His power to draw public attention had vanished.  
 
Potential Impact on the Rule of Law and Corruption 
 
In contrast to the first case study, in the Dymovskiy scandal, none of the culprits denounced by 
the police major and his followers were punished. None of the nuisances made public were 
abolished. On the contrary, two of the accused corrupt lower level police officials were even 
compensated 50,000 roubles for libel. Moreover, several obviously biased court sentences against 
Dymovskiy most probably substantiated the wide-spread belief amongst Russians of their judicial 
system being highly corruptible and prone to the pressure of powerful interests. In the end, the 
perceived outcomes of this scandal, very likely, did not deter government officials from taking 
bribes and were even detrimental to the belief of common Russians in the 'rule of law'. 
 
Success of the Strategies of 'Scandal Management' Pursued by the Ruling Elites 
 
Were the ruling elites successful in managing the Dymovskiy scandal? Overall, the impact of the 
Dymovskiy affair on common Russians can be considered as rather limited, as the leading state-
controlled TV channels did not cover the scandal at all. According to a survey of the independent 
polling institute Levada Center carried out at the end of November 2009, approximately 84 
percent of all Russians either had not heard about the Dymovskiy affair or had only a vague 
notion what it was about (Levada, 2009). However, this survey vice versa evidences that a 
substantial proportion of 16 percent of Russians – and amongst them the more educated and the 
more politically interested – had followed the scandal and its outcomes rather closely. This 
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proportion of the population was, most probably, left with a series of rather negative impressions. 
In essence, the course of the Dymovskiy scandal and the reactions of the authorities vividly 
showcased the helplessness of the central government in effectively tackling the problem of 
wide-spread police corruption. Consequently, in this case study, the endeavours of the ruling 
elites to avert political damage can be considered as only partly successful.  
 
Discussion: The Two Case Studies in Comparison 
 
Comparing the two case studies examined in the previous sections along the four dimensions 
elaborated in this article, we can draw the following conclusions:  
 
Travelling of News Memes and Patterns of Communication 
In both case studies, the majority of blog, microblog and forum entries appeared in the new 
sphere of social media only after the scandal had been reported extensively by traditional mass 
media outlets. Thus, even though both scandals emanated from the sphere of social media, and 
even though both were perceived widely as 'internet scandals' by the Russian public, traditional 
mass media played a crucial role not only in the outbreak but also in the framing of the two 
scandals.  
 
Strategies of 'Scandal Management' Pursued by the Ruling Elites 
In a first step and wherever possible, the ruling elites sought to collaborate with the whistle-
blower who uploaded the scandalous materials. If the whistle-blower agreed to co-operate (case 
study 1), a favourable (re-)framing of the scandalous events in the sphere of official media was 
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attempted. In the newscasts of the powerful state-controlled TV channels, public outrage was 
very swiftly deflected towards lower level authorities and foreign, supposedly hostile powers. In 
the Living Shield scandal, the political elites even managed to create the impression that they 
were not only tolerating freedom of speech but even fighting police corruption efficiently with 
the help of critical citizens and the new technology internet. Very deftly, both scandals were 
presented in ways that generated public support for specific political goals and strengthened 
certain positions in internal power struggles. The framing of the Living Shield Scandal, for 
instance, was used to create a favourable climate for the pending, poignant reform of the police 
forces and, in particular, to put pressure on the powerful but lethargic bureaucracy of the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. The opportunities for such deft reframing of the occurrences seemed limited, 
though, if the whistleblower refused to co-operate (case study 2). In this case, information about 
the scandal was banned from the sphere of official media and, as far as possible, suppressed in 
mainstream mass media. Simultaneously, a toolkit of real-life pressure mechanisms was 
employed, consisting mainly of obviously rigged court sentences against the whistleblower and 
physical violence.  
 
Potential Impact on Corruption and the Rule of Law 
In the first case study (the Living Shield scandal), selected culprits were punished for their 
misconduct. These widely reported sanctions had, most probably, a deterring effect on other low 
and mid level police officers. By contrast, in the second case study (the Dymovskiy affair), none 
of the nuisances made public was abolished, and none of the denounced culprits was punished. In 
this case, wide-spread impressions of impunity of corruption were reinforced. From these 
outcomes, we can infer that the new sphere of social media can help to limit misconduct and 
corruption amongst low and mid level officials – yet only, if vital interests of higher level elites 
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are not affected. Only with this restriction, we can assume that social media in Russia fulfil a 
certain democratic 'control' or even 'muckraking' function.  
Do scandals arising from the new sphere of social media contribute to a strengthening of the rule 
of law? As the two case studies illustrated, this is most probably not the case. In the Dymovskiy 
scandal, the law was bent rather bluntly to bring about a series of highly questionable court 
sentences that pressured the whistleblower to stop his political activities. In the Living Shield 
scandal, selected culprits were punished and all victims compensated, but these sanctions were 
not imposed according to provisions of law. Rather, the measures were carried out on the 
personal orders of high-ranking officials, in line with their political strategies in the struggle for 
political power.  
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Success of the Strategies of 'Scandal Management' Pursued by the Ruling Elites. 
As the two case studies illustrated, Russia's ruling elites are currently very much capable of 
managing public outrage arising from the new sphere of social media according to their specific 
political aims. Thus, these scandals are currently not posing a serious threat, neither to the 
reputation of Russia's ruling 'tandem of power' nor to the perceived legitimacy of the semi-
authoritarian regime as a whole. This is partly due to the fact that the new sphere of social media 
has to be seen as functioning in symbiosis with three other spheres of mass media, with the most 
powerful of these being the tightly state-controlled sphere of official media. Moreover, public 
outrage can easily be tamed because other state bodies that typically control executive power in 
developed democracies, such as independent courts or legislative institutions, are weak. Yet, to a 
certain degree, the success of the 'scandal management' seems to depend on the willingness of the 
whistle-blowers to collaborate.  
 
Conclusion 
Contrary to Markovits and Silverstein's basic assumption quoted as an epigraph to this article, 
scandals can not only occur in liberal democracies, but they do also happen in semi-authoritarian 
environments. A strong faith of citizens in the liberal political process (Markovits and Silverstein, 
1988: 6-7) also does not seem to be a necessary prerequisite for political scandal. As the two case 
studies presented in this article vividly illustrated, public outrage over key political issues can 
also be sparked by blatant violations of moral feelings deeply rooted in the populace. Russian 
citizens were not outraged because the culprits of the scandals had broken the law. Nor did they 
later care if they were punished according to it. Rather, they were appalled because they shared 
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the deep moral feeling that the occurrences were so despicable that they simply should not 
happen in their country.  
More central to the understanding of political scandal in semi-democratic regimes seems Neckel's 
claim that 'power and control bodies must not coincide' (Neckel, 2005: 103). As a matter of fact, 
the scandals presented in this article could not have occurred without the existence of certain 
'spheres' of media that functioned independently of central power. The relative weight of these 
media spheres, their respective political ideologies and internal structures seem to be crucial 
variables that determine the course and outcome of political scandals in semi-authoritarian 
environments. Within the semi-pluralistic media landscape of contemporary Russia, one – albeit 
only one – of these media spheres is the networked sphere of social media. Therefore, one of the 
key lessons that this article might teach for future research is that we should look at new media 
more as they function not in isolation of, but in tandem with traditional mass media. 
How can the empirical findings of this article be interpreted in the light of the currently ongoing 
academic debate on the 'liberating role' of the new technology internet (Dreibert and Rohozinski, 
2010: 50; Diamond, 2010)? Would the two scandals under investigation have happened before 
the rise of social media networks? And if so, then how? Is the new, networked sphere actually 
'empowering' Russian citizens? As to the first case study of the Living Shield scandal, a nearly 
identical incident happened in 2008 in Minsk, the capital of the neighbouring Belarus, in a 
comparable socio-political environment – yet without any involvement of social media. 
Interestingly, the course and even the outcome of the scandal (the punishment of the various 
ranks of police officers) were largely identical. The most striking difference was that the 
information about the incident reached the mass media not through a YouTube-video, but 
through the attorney of one of the affected drivers who filed a lawsuit (Naviny, 2008). 
Accordingly, it took nine days for the scandal to erupt in the Belarusian mass media, in 
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comparison with only four days in the Russian case. As this contrast case suggests, the new 
sphere of social media did not more than accelerate the course of the Living Shield scandal. The 
interpretation of the event as an 'example of the power of blogs and bloggers' (Abstract2001, 
2009), expressed by many Russian observers, thus seems clearly misleading. 
By contrast, the Dymovskiy case study would definitely not have happened before the rise of 
social media. This scandal, in its very core, seemed to be rooted in the video message itself. What 
Dymovskiy said, was not 'scandalous'. The police officer was only speaking out things that 
everybody knew, i.e. that the Russian police are corrupt. Perceived as 'scandalous', though, was 
the fact that the situation had gotten so bad that a middle rank police officer would be frustrated 
enough to sit down in front of a webcam, record a video, upload it to the internet, and destroy his 
entire life. Had Dymovskiy contacted journalists at national newspapers with his 'disclosures', his 
story would most probably never have been published. Even the video messages of his immediate 
followers, who recorded similar clips, were already attracting much less public attention. Thus, 
Dymovskiy's rise to popularity seems partly due to the fact that he was the first police officer 
using the new technology to denounce police corruption. 
In addition, however, the outbreak and the course of the scandal were severely characterized by 
new avenues of social action opened up by the new technology: First of all, Dymovskiy could 
record and publish his video message at virtually no costs. Second, the video message was not 
only broadcasted once and in a short-cut version, as it could have also happened on traditional 
TV. Instead, the clip was accessible for all citizens online at all times, in full length, and again at 
virtually no costs. In particular, the clip was freely accessible to all gatekeepers of the traditional 
mass media sphere who could pass on the news, with minimal delay, to the huge audiences of 
their outlets. It was under these very specific conditions that the ordinary police officer 
Dymovskiy could rise to enormous popularity within less than a week. In this sense, the sphere of 
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social media actually empowered Dymovskiy – a voice that, in a traditional media environment, 
would never have been heard. Thus, while the new networks of social media did not more than 
facilitate the task of the whistle-blower Sutyagin, the new technology was a necessary 
precondition for the temporary empowerment of the 'honest police officer Dymovskiy'.  
At the same time, however, the two case studies did also clearly showcase the limits of the 
'liberating potential' of the new technology. In both scandals, social media were of no help in 
'following up' the scandals. The harsh sentence for the low ranking police officer in the Living 
Shield scandal, for instance, and the complex idea of his trial being staged by the ruling elites did 
not spark peaks of intense communication in the blogosphere. Meanwhile, the attention of the 
networked crowd had shifted to other, more 'outraging' issues: new scandals. Following up events 
and reaching a wider audience with coherent political messages, though, seems crucial for a 
public sphere if the goal is to effectively control and challenge those in power.    
Thus, in the end, technology appears to be 'merely a tool', as Diamond (2010: 72) noted, with 
people, organisation and governments making the difference. Scandals emanating from the new 
sphere of social media can be both, beneficial and detrimental to the democratisation of 
authoritarian regimes. Yet, it seems obvious that 'groundswells of public conversation around 
politically inflammatory topics' (MacKinnon, 2008) have been among the severest challenges to 
political elites in non-democratic regimes all over the world that emanated from the new 
networked spheres of social media in recent years. Thinking of these outbursts of public outrage 
as 'scandals', as proposed in this article, seems an imaginative and prolific way to generate a 
deeper understanding of these phenomena. Firstly, this approach relates the subject to a strong 
body of literature deeply rooted in the disciplines of sociology, communication and political 
science. Secondly, the scandal approach turns the lens beyond specific patterns of communication 
within the social media sphere to a broader context of socio-political and cultural factors. For 
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these reasons, the approach proposed in this paper seems to open up promising avenues for 
further comparative research across all cultural and political contexts. Whilst the scope of this 
article was limited to two case studies from Russia, it certainly would be fascinating to see how 
the findings are paralleled by or deviate from those, for instance, related to internet scandals in 
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Figure 1. The Four Spheres of the Contemporary Russian, Semi-Free Media Landscape 
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